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The regulation of competition and procurement in the National Health Service 
2015-2018: enduring hierarchical control and the limits of juridification 
Dorota Osipovič, Pauline Allen, Marie Sanderson, Valerie Moran, Kath 
Checkland 
ABSTRACT 
Since 1990, market mechanisms have occurred in the predominantly hierarchical 
NHS. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 led to concerns that market principles 
had been irrevocably embedded in the NHS and that the regulators would acquire 
unwarranted power compared to politicians (known as ‘juridification’). In order to 
assess this concern, we analysed regulatory activity in the period from 2015 to 2018. 
We explored how economic regulation of the NHS had changed in the light of the 
policy turn back to hierarchy in 2014 and the changes in the legislative framework 
under the Public Contracts Regulations 2015. We found the continuing dominance of 
hierarchical modes of control was reflected in the relative dominance and behaviour 
of the sector economic regulator. But there had also been a limited degree of 
juridification involving the courts. Generally, the regulatory decisions were 
consistent with the 2014 policy shift away from market principles and consistent 
with the enduring role of hierarchy in the NHS, but the existing legislative regime 
did allow the incursion of pro market regulatory decision making, and instances of 
such decisions were identified. 
KEY WORDS: competition, regulation, health care, juridification, market, 
hierarchy  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA 2012) codified the mechanisms 
governing provider competition in the English NHS, leading to concern about the 
potential for the regulation of competition to become excessively juridified 
(Benbow, 2018; Davies, 2013). At its core the process of juridification involves a 
shift of power away from the executive branch of the government towards the 
judiciary. Thus juridification impacts the relationship between law and politics in the 
liberal democracies (Aasen et al., 2014).  
Juridification is a multidimensional phenomenon reflecting such aspects as an 
imposition of explicit and specific legal regulation in areas previously subject to 
executive discretion, as well as increased legal framing and conflict resolution with 
reference to law (Blichner and Molander, 2008). In the case of the governance of the 
internal market in the English NHS, juridification entails the introduction of 
legislative rules into a system traditionally governed by the principles of hierarchical 
‘command and control’ and subject to political priorities. Such excess juridification 
with regards to the regulation of competition in the NHS was seen as unwelcome due 
to its potential to decrease accountability of commissioners and to increase private 
sector penetration of the internal NHS market, while strengthening market 
mechanisms (Davies, 2013).  
In our previous analysis of regulatory activity conducted early in the HSCA 2012 
regime we found limited evidence of juridification (Sanderson et al., 2016). We 
argued that although the regulatory structures put in place by the HSCA 2012 had the 
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potential to strengthen the enforcement of competition in the NHS, in practice the 
extent of juridification was limited due to the development of systems within the 
NHS to manage and resolve issues internally where possible (Sanderson et al., 
2016). Following a rejection of the NHS hospital merger in Dorset made by the 
national competition regulator in 2013, the internal NHS regulator Monitor has 
adopted a role of a mediator between the NHS and the national competition 
authorities in relation to mergers to allow NHS mergers to progress. At the same 
time the tradition of settling procurement disputes without formal investigations or 
legal challenges continued (Sanderson et al., 2016). 
The HSCA 2012 represented a culmination of the expansion of the market principles 
into the NHS, with competition becoming not just a matter of internal policy 
administered through the NHS hierarchy, but that of law. Yet since the publication of 
the Five Year Forward View strategic plan (NHSE, 2014), the principle of 
cooperation has been elevated to become the preferred mechanism governing the 
supply of health care services. To date there have been no corresponding changes in 
the law to reflect this renewed policy emphasis on cooperation and integration, 
creating dissonance between the legal framework and commissioning policy and 
practice. Concurrently, there have been some developments in the regulatory 
framework in the form of extension of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 to 
include health care services pulling in the opposite direction and having a potential 
to further strengthen the market mechanisms within the NHS. As a result, there have 
been growing concerns among commissioners and policy makers about the law 
being out of step with the policy priorities and calls for changes to the legislation, 
culminating in the NHS Long Term Plan’s list of required legislative changes 
(NHSE, 2019). 
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Given the recent policy turn to cooperation coupled with significant changes in the 
legal framework governing competition and procurement within the NHS there was 
a need to assess empirically recent regulatory decisions with regards to the 
enforcement of competition and procurement rules in the NHS to see if juridification 
has in fact been increasing, and whether legislative change is in fact necessary. As it 
currently stands, there are three public bodies with a mandate to make the regulatory 
decisions with regards to competition and procurement in the NHS: the sector 
economic regulator Monitor, now part of a body called NHS Improvement 
(Monitor/NHSI); the national competition regulator, the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA); and the courts. Examining the actions of the regulators is 
important because they impact the actions of other actors within the system; the rules 
on the use of competition in the NHS are ambiguous, providers and commissioners 
look to the regulators for guidance on how to interpret them (Osipovič et al., 2016). 
The way the regulatory decisions are made and enforced, and by whom, also 
indicates the distribution of power between different public bodies within the state.  
We investigated how the legislative framework and policy guidance featured in the 
published regulatory decisions regarding competition and procurement in the NHS 
between 2015 and 2018. Due to the general limitations of the markets in health 
services and specific conditions of the NHS as a publicly funded system, the notion 
of competition in the NHS is balanced against the need to achieve wider social goals 
and is subject to sector specific rules. In this paper we analysed the extent to which 
such sector specific view of competition tailored to the conditions of the NHS 
internal market prevailed in the regulatory decisions, as opposed to principles of the 
general law on competition.  
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We found that the bulk of regulatory activity with regards to provider mergers and 
procurement disputes was carried out by the internal sector regulator Monitor/NHSI 
and was subject to sector specific rules. Our findings point to a continuing 
dominance and resilience of the hierarchical modes of control within the English 
NHS (see e.g. Allen, 2013). NHS hierarchy has managed to successfully resist 
juridification of regulation on competition and continued to apply internal, sector 
specific principles and mechanisms to settle procurement disputes and assure 
transactions. As far as the regulation of mergers and acquisitions between NHS 
providers is concerned, we found that the national regulator of competition the CMA 
has been made to adopt the sector specific rules. One of the strategies of resistance 
deployed by Monitor/NHSI was to decrease the visibility and transparency of their 
decision making processes around enforcement of competition. This had the effect of 
moving competition issues out of sight and thus down the policy agenda. This 
behaviour could be interpreted by the actors in the system as permission and 
encouragement to utilise the existing flexibilities within the law to downplay the 
competition principle in their decision making.  
However, simultaneously we also found one area where the NHS hierarchy was not 
successful in keeping the regulation of competition an internal matter for the NHS. 
Our analysis showed an increasing role for the courts in adjudicating procurement 
disputes compared with the previous period. An extension of the Public Contracts 
Regulations 2015 (stemming from an EU directive) to health care services 
procurement has made it easier for providers to mount legal challenges based on 
procedural breaches of procurement processes. Yet in our view the scale of this 
juridification remains limited in comparison with the volume of the regulatory 
activity by the sector regulator Monitor/NHSI. 
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The structure of the paper is the following. In order to situate our findings, we recap 
the regulatory framework put in place by the HSCA 2012 and discuss the recent 
(post-2014) changes in the legal framework and the policy direction. We outline our 
approach to data collection and present the findings of the analysis of the regulatory 
decisions. In the final section we trace the policy implications of the findings and 
situate the findings in the economic and governance literatures.  
THE REGULATION OF NHS COMPETITION UNDER THE HSCA 2012 
Since the introduction of a quasi-market in the English NHS at the beginning of the 
1990s, service provision is managed by commissioning bodies which procure 
services on behalf of patients. Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) are currently 
the local bodies responsible for commissioning the majority of services, overseen by 
NHS England (NHSE). NHSE also has some direct commissioning responsibility for 
low volume/high complexity services, and for primary care services. Competition 
(either ‘for the market’ or ‘in the market’) is one of the mechanisms used by 
commissioners to allocate resources to service providers. Competitive behaviour 
within the quasi-market is heavily regulated by the economic regulator 
Monitor/NHSI and hierarchical aspects of the NHS extend to the supply side (Allen, 
2013) (for further details on the NHS system in England see Appendix 1).  
The premise that competition would benefit the NHS by increasing efficiency, 
quality and responsiveness to patients has been a cornerstone of the English health 
policy since the beginning of the 1990s (Jones and Mays, 2009; DH, 2010). Yet it 
was necessary for the NHS to adopt the sector specific regulation of competition due 
to the special nature of the market in relation to health care. Markets in health care 
do not conform to the features of the perfect market because of the significant 
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asymmetries of information between providers of care and patients (or their agents) 
limiting patient choice, the need to regulate the quality of providers limiting the 
freedom to supply services and considerable market entry and running costs of 
providing services which limit the number of potential suppliers (Allen, 2013). In 
addition, markets do not give any regard to the principle of fair and free access to 
care according to need which is fundamental in the English NHS. In the light of 
these limitations, whilst the main objective of general competition law is the 
maximisation of consumer welfare, in the sector specific law the objective to uphold 
and protect competition is balanced against other objectives, such as the achievement 
of wider social goals. In particular, the principle of competition in the NHS is not 
deemed to have an intrinsic value but is checked and balanced against that of 
patients’ interests, such as equal access to services. 
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 extended competition law to apply to the 
planning and provision of the NHS services by making explicit links between the 
sector-specific rules governing competition within the NHS and existing national 
competition legislation (Sanderson et al., 2016). In particular, the sector economic 
regulator Monitor (which became part of NHS Improvement on 1st of April 2016) 
was assigned concurrent powers with the national competition regulator the CMA in 
preventing anti-competitive behaviour and abuse of dominant position (Sanderson et 
al., 2016). Any transactions between providers such as mergers, acquisitions or joint 
ventures are subject to review by the sector and/or national competition regulators. If 
a transaction involves at least one NHS Foundation Trust (NHS FT), a type of NHS 
provider with a greater degree of autonomy established under the Health and Social 
Care Act 2003 (Allen et al., 2012), the CMA applies change of control, turnover and 
share of supply tests to determine whether a particular case results in a “relevant 
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merger situation” (CMA, 2014: 18). Under Section 79 of the HSCA 2012 and 
Section 30(1)(a) of the Enterprise Act 2002, if a merger involves NHS FTs, 
Monitor/NHSI has a duty to provide advice to the CMA on the associated patient 
benefits. According to the CMA’s guidance, NHSI’s advice is not binding on the 
CMA, but is given significant weight due to NHSI’s expertise as the sector regulator 
(CMA, 2014: 46). 
Another key regulatory mechanism which Monitor acquired under the HSCA 2012 is 
provider licencing. All providers of NHS-funded services are obliged to obtain a 
licence and obey the licence conditions. One of these (Condition C2 – Competition 
oversight) prohibits the provider from engaging in anti-competitive conduct (such as 
collusion) where this is detrimental to patient interests (Monitor, 2014a). Under the 
HSCA 2012 Monitor/NHSI has powers to take action against suspected breaches of 
provider licence conditions. 
The secondary legislation introduced by the Procurement, Patient Choice and 
Competition Regulations (No. 2) 2013 (PPCCR 2013) suggested that competitive 
tendering is to be the preferred method of procuring clinical services. However, the 
PPCCR 2013 are complex. Regulations 2 and 3 stipulate that commissioners must 
procure services from providers who are most capable of providing services which 
secure needs of patients, improve quality, efficiency and integration of services, and 
provide best value for money. Commissioners are required to act transparently and 
proportionately and treat different types of providers equally and in a non-
discriminatory way. Regulation 5 stipulates that commissioners can award a contract 
to a particular provider without running a procurement process if “the services to 
which the contract relates are capable of being provided only by that provider”. This 
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regulation, alongside a number of different factors that ought to be taken into 
account during commissioning decisions, give latitude to commissioners as to 
whether to procure services competitively. Regulation 4 requires that commissioners 
consider patients’ rights to exercise a choice of a provider, the integration of services 
and providers being able to compete as means of improving the quality and 
efficiency of provision of services.  
The PPCCR 2013 give powers to Monitor/NHSI to investigate any alleged breaches 
of the procurement processes by CCGs or NHSE following a provider complaint or 
on its own initiative. Monitor/NHSI can declare the relevant arrangements 
ineffective and has broad powers to give directions as to what should be done by the 
commissioners but the regulator cannot order that the commissioners hold a 
competitive tender process.  
The rules governing competition in the NHS and the arrangements for their 
enforcement are complex.  Whilst all the rules have a status of law and their breaches 
may be challenged in the courts, some rules such as HSCA 2012 and PPCCR 2013 
apply only to health care and are referred to in this paper as ‘sector specific’ rules. 
These rules take into account specific features of the health care system in England 
and endorse a quasi-market principle of competition in health care (see Appendix 2 
for a summary of the legal framework).   
CHANGES IN THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT SINCE THE 
PUBLICATION OF THE FIVE YEAR FORWARD VIEW  
In October 2014 NHS England published a policy document, the Five Year Forward 
View, which outlined a strategic policy vision for the NHS underpinned by the 
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closer cooperation between different providers (NHSE, 2014). This has led to some 
changes to the legal rules and policy guidance governing organisational behaviour in 
the NHS. 
Policy direction 
In contrast to the legislative framework, policy developments led by NHS England 
promoted cooperative modes of coordination and downplayed the role of 
competition. The Five Year Forward View policy plan envisaged a number of 
collaborative service delivery models requiring breaking down of organisational 
boundaries between primary, community, acute, mental health and social care 
sectors and between different providers within each service sector (NHSE, 2014). 
Other reports, e.g. the Dalton Review, discussed potential organisational forms for 
promoting greater collaboration and consolidation in the acute sector (Dalton, 2014). 
The turn towards greater integration and collaboration was reinforced by the national 
planning guidance issued in late 2015 (NHSE et al., 2015). This document stated that 
the NHS should concentrate on local, place based planning to be achieved by 
cooperation between local stakeholders. The plans were to be called ‘Sustainability 
and Transformation Plans’ later renamed into ‘Sustainability and Transformation 
Partnerships’. Guidance emphasised that “planning by individual institutions will 
increasingly be supplemented with planning by place for local populations” and that 
the NHS was too focused on   “organisational separation and autonomy that doesn’t 
make sense to staff or the patients and communities they serve” (NHSE et al., 2015). 
The policy direction away from competition was reiterated in the further policy 
documents (NHSE, 2017) and public statements by senior NHS leaders, with Simon 
Stevens (CEO of NHSE) stating on several occasions that competition was not 
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appropriate for NHS organisations, which needed to reduce their ‘institutional self-
interest’ in the interest of the whole local health economy (e.g. Dunhill, 2016; 
Thomas and West, 2017). This has culminated in the explicit call to repeal pro-
competitive regulations in the NHS Long Term Plan (NHSE, 2019). 
Public Contracts Regulations 2015 
Simultaneously, there was a significant development in the legal framework. The 
Public Contracts Regulations 2006 were replaced by the Public Contracts 
Regulations 2015 (PCR 2015) which came into force in April 2016. The PCR 2015 
implemented the EU Public Sector Procurement Directive (2014/24/EU), which 
provided rules for the procurement of goods, services and works above certain 
financial thresholds by public authorities. In the 2006 Regulations health care 
services fell under a so called ‘Part B’ provision which meant that commissioners 
were able to award a contract without advertising where there was no cross-border 
interest (DH, 2016). The PCR 2015 abolished this exemption and introduced certain 
other requirements on commissioners in respect of competitive procurement of 
health care services. In particular, the procurement of health services above a certain 
threshold1 fell under a so called Light Touch Regime (LTR).  
The LTR process allowed for certain flexibilities in the procurement process but also 
imposed mandatory constraints. Rather than following a standardised procurement 
routes, health care commissioners have considerable flexibility in designing their 
own procedure, for instance by deciding the contract award criteria, splitting 
contracts into lots or carrying out market engagement. However, they are required to: 
advertise procurement opportunities by publishing contract or Prior Information 
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notices in the Official Journal of the European Union and Contracts Finder, an online 
database of contract opportunities with the UK government and its agencies; to make 
all documents available in advance of the procurement; to publish contract award 
notices; and to include a standstill period. The latter refers to a period between 
notification of a contract award decision to bidders and actual conclusion of the 
contract, allowing any bidders to challenge the decision. Moreover, the tailor made 
procurement procedures under the LTR ought to be relevant, reasonable and 
proportionate and should not breach the equal treatment and transparency principles. 
Thus in contrast with the previous period, the PCR 2015 imposed on NHS 
commissioners a requirement to openly advertise and follow a transparent 
procurement process where the contract value exceeds the relevant threshold.  
The regulators 
In the light of growing discrepancies between the existing legal framework and 
policy makers’ emphasis on providers and commissioners working collaboratively, 
the regulators have been required to perform a difficult balancing act. At the same 
time the financial problems of many provider trusts became increasingly apparent 
(Gainsbury, 2017). These structural conditions delineated the space for the 
regulators’ actions.  
Firstly, in April 2016 Monitor/NHSI and the CMA signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) which clarified the issues in respect of the exercise of their 
concurrent powers in monitoring anti-competitive transactions and conduct, and 
investigating the market and merger reviews (CMA and NHSI, 2016). In the MoU 
the sector and national regulators committed to working together and having “regard 
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to the distinctive characteristics of the sector” (CMA and NHSI, 2016: 2). The CMA 
committed to cooperation with the sector regulator and acknowledged that 
Monitor/NHSI’s role is limited “to preventing anti-competitive behaviour that is 
detrimental to patients’ interests” (CMA and NHSI, 2016: 8). 
Secondly, Monitor/NHSI and NHSE strengthened their provider and commissioner 
monitoring systems. Monitor/NHSI exercised statutory powers of supporting, 
reviewing and approving transactions involving NHS trusts, including mergers and 
acquisitions, through an internal NHS transaction review process (NHSI, 2017). The 
aim of this process was to carry out an assessment as to whether a proposed 
transaction leads to improved performance such as releasing economies of scale or 
improving patient care (NHSI, 2017: 14). In cases involving merger and 
acquisitions, Monitor/NHSI also supports trusts in developing a sound rationale for 
the merger and helps to determine whether the CMA ought to be notified of the 
transaction.2  
The transaction review process was aligned with the Integrated Support and 
Assurance Process (ISAP) developed jointly by the Monitor/NHSI and NHSE and 
designed to risk assess large and complex contractual arrangements that 
commissioners intend to put in place (NHSE and NHSI, 2017). The ISAP was 
introduced in 2016 to prevent a repeat of the collapse of the £726m UnitingCare 
Partnership contract in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough (NAO, 2016; Waller and 
Carter, 2017; NHSE and NHSI, 2017). The contract awarded following a 
competitive tendering process to UnitingCare Partnership, a limited liability 
partnership between two local acute NHS FTs subcontracting with a range of other 
NHS and independent providers, was terminated after eight months due to the failure 
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to reach agreement on contract costs (NAO, 2016). The ISAP is focussed on 
mitigating financial risks and appraising whole system consequences of novel 
organisational arrangements in the NHS but was not designed to test for compliance 
with the procurement regulations (NHSE and NHSI, 2017).  
It appears that following the policy turn to collaboration and the increasingly 
apparent financial problems of NHS trusts as a result of mounting deficits and cost-
cutting pressures, the sector regulator Monitor/NHSI strengthened the scrutiny of the 
financial risks of proposed transactions and the optimisation of provision in the cash-
strapped system. Concerns about ensuring that appropriate levels of competition 
exist within the system became of secondary importance to Monitor/NHSI.  
Moreover, Monitor/NHSI was itself subject to restructuring. In 2018 Monitor/NHSI 
set up joint management structures and closer working with NHS England, the 
national executive body with commissioning oversight (Carding, 2018). Thus, the 
role of an independent, sector based regulator of competition was being increasingly 
diluted and merged with the pre-existing NHS hierarchical means of control, perhaps 
reflecting the diminishing salience of market mechanisms in the NHS. This has 
culminated in explicit statements in the LTP that the two bodies should cease to act 
as arms length regulators (NHSE, 2019). 
The courts 
As the PCR 2015 extended the reach of the public contracts regulations to the 
procurement of health care services, this provided an avenue for increasing the role 
of the courts in adjudicating procurement disputes. NHS commissioners had to 
ensure that their procurement strategy complies with both the PPCCR 2013 and PCR 
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2015. In an event of non-compliance, providers could pursue a legal challenge based 
on the breaches of either regulations.3  
In particular, under the regulations 95 and 96 of the PCR 2015 the remedies 
available to providers who launch a legal challenge include submitting a claim form 
which stops the public authority from going ahead with signing of the contract with a 
winning bidder. This results in an automatic suspension of the contract. The 
authority can apply to the court to have the suspension lifted. If the contract has 
already been signed, the court may find it ineffective based on procedural grounds 
such as failure to advertise as required or failure to abide by the standstill periods. 
The providers could also apply to the court for a judicial review of commissioners’ 
actions on the basis of the PPCCR 2013. There was also a possibility of having a 
judicial review of the regulators’ actions under the general principles of 
administrative law. Yet arguably the relative ease of mounting a legal challenge 
based on the procedural breaches under the PCR 2015 alongside a possibility to 
trigger an automatic suspension of the contract award process, made this an 
attractive option for providers to explore as a way of putting pressure on the 
commissioners.  
SEARCH STRATEGY AND DATA 
We analysed the regulatory decisions made between August 2015 and October 2018 
in order to provide continuity with our previous work covering the period from 
January 2009 to August 2015 (Sanderson et al., 2016).  Our approach was to focus 
on the regulatory decisions which were in the public domain as these were most 
likely to impact the practices and strategies of the actors in the system. Yet gathering 
empirical data on the regulatory activity with regards to the enforcement of the 
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competition in the NHS has proved challenging. The first hurdle pertained to the fact 
that there was no single data source recording the outcomes of the regulatory 
decisions reached by the three regulatory bodies which have authority in this respect. 
Secondly, and more crucially, the regulatory bodies take different approaches to the 
level of transparency they afford to their regulatory decisions, with the sector 
regulator Monitor/NHSI being the least transparent compared to the CMA and the 
courts.  
Given the ensuing complexity of collating relevant empirical data, our approach was 
to cast our net wide in terms of information available in the public domain. We 
reviewed Health Services Journal (HSJ), the main trade press title covering the 
health care sector in England, for relevant cases mentioning a potential or actual 
merger involving at least one NHS provider or a procurement dispute pertaining to 
provision of clinical services involving at least one public sector body 
(commissioner or provider). This allowed us to establish an initial database of cases 
covering the reviewed period. We proceeded by searching Monitor/NHSI’s, CMA’s, 
UK government’s4 and the British and Irish Legal Information Institute’s websites as 
well as utilising the Google search engine to refine the initial database, triangulate 
data sources and obtain follow up information on relevant cases. We organised the 
data in an excel spreadsheet by case and kept updating it with new information 
relating to a particular case as and when it became available.  
By following this method, we identified 29 cases of potential or approved 
mergers/acquisitions/joint ventures and 15 cases of commissioning/procurement 
disputes. These figures include all of the formal regulatory decisions reached by the 
CMA, Monitor/NHSI and the courts in the reviewed period which were publicly 
disclosed, i.e. details of the case were published on a particular authority’s website, 
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and which are reported in Table 1 and 2. The overall number of cases identified 
through our search strategy may underestimate the scale of the ongoing regulatory 
activity with regards to organisational transactions and procurement disputes. We 
expect that a number of additional cases pertaining either to procurement disputes or 
transaction reviews, particularly those which were dealt by Monitor/NHSI, have not 
been reported in the HSJ.   
RESULTS 
Despite a considerable volume of procurement disputes (15 cases) and merger cases 
(29 cases) identified through HSJ search, there were relatively few cases where the 
regulatory bodies made formal decisions which were made public (see Table 1 and 
2). The difference between the volume of transaction cases and disputes reported in 
the sector press and those cases which were brought to the attention of the regulators 
and resulted in a formal, publicly disclosed regulatory decisions implies that a 
substantial number of transactions and procurement disputes are being reviewed and 
resolved internally by Monitor/NHSI. The information on the precise number and 
details of cases handled by Monitor/NHSI is not publicly available.  
We proceed by discussing the publicly disclosed regulatory decisions made by the 
relevant authorities with regards to mergers and acquisitions and procurement 
disputes and situate such decisions in a wider context of regulatory activity.  
Mergers and acquisitions 
Compared with the previous period (2009-2015) (see Sanderson et al., 2016), we 
found that the national competition regulator has adapted its approach to the NHS. 
Following Monitor/NHSI’s advice, the CMA acknowledged that in some 
circumstances greater consolidation of providers can bring substantial patient 
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benefits. The CMA also acknowledged the limited financial budget of the NHS as a 
whole may dampen competitive pressures. All mergers between NHS FTs which 
were reviewed by the CMA were approved (see Table 1). We also found at least 
seven cases of completed mergers and acquisitions between the NHS trusts which 
were not reviewed by the CMA, despite involving NHS FTs. We can assume that 
these were approved by the sector regulator Monitor/NHSI. We also identified at 
least four cases where the proposed merger or acquisition between the NHS trusts 
was blocked by Monitor/NHSI.  
Table 1. Summary of regulatory decisions regarding competition in the NHS 
(August 2015 – October 2018)  
Case type Decision-making body Cases investigated Outcome of the investigation and 
date 
Acquisition Monitor/ NHS 
Improvement 
Missing data Missing data 
 
Competition and 
Markets Authority 
 
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS 
FT and Heart of England NHS FT  
 
 
Phase 1* clearance 14/09/2017 
 
Derby Teaching Hospitals NHS FT and 
Burton Hospitals NHS FT  
 
Phase 1 clearance 05/04/2018 
 
Merger Monitor/ NHS 
Improvement 
Missing data Missing data 
 
Competition and 
Markets Authority 
 
Ashford and St Peter's Hospitals NHS 
FT and Royal Surrey County Hospital 
NHS FT 
 
 
Phase 2* clearance 16/09/2015 
 
 
 
Central Manchester University 
Hospitals NHS FT and University 
Hospital of South Manchester NHS FT 
Phase 2 clearance 03/08/2017 
 
Joint Venture Monitor/ NHS 
Improvement 
Missing data Missing data 
 
Competition and 
Markets Authority 
 
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS 
FT and HCA International Ltd 
 
Approved without investigation 
18/08/2017 
 
* The CMA conducts a two-stage merger review process. It has discretion to conclude the review 
after initial Phase 1 or to instigate an in-depth Phase 2.  
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Between August 2015 and October 2018 two merger and two acquisition cases were 
reviewed by the CMA (see Table 1). Where the CMA found that a merger or 
acquisition between two NHS FTs will result in the substantial lessening of 
competition (SLC), the relevant customer benefits (RCB) were found to outweigh 
that (CMA, 2017a; CMA, 2018a). For instance, the CMA found that the proposed 
merger between Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and 
University Hospital of South Manchester NHS Foundation Trust would lead to 
substantial lessening of competition in the provision of some services (CMA, 
2017a). It also found that prohibition of the merger would be the only effective 
remedy in this case. Nevertheless, the regulator concluded that such a prohibition 
would be disproportionate as it would result in the loss of substantial patient benefits 
which might arise as a result of the merger. In this case the CMA placed significant 
weight on NHSI’s and local stakeholders’ opinions which were strongly supportive 
of the merger. In the final report on the merger case, the CMA also acknowledged 
the systemic constraints that the NHS providers are facing (CMA, 2017a: 5). 
The CMA’s approach to handling the NHS mergers reflects a successful redefining 
of the role of competition in the NHS according to the sector specific rather than 
general understanding of the principle. Furthermore, our analysis of the cases of 
mergers reported in the HSJ implies that at least eleven cases of completed or 
proposed transactions between NHS providers have been handled by Monitor/NHSI 
without being referred to the CMA by using internal processes such as 
Monitor/NHSI’s transaction review process (NHSI, 2017). Monitor/NHSI’s 
transactions assurance processes were not open to public scrutiny, but press reports 
of the proposed mergers or acquisitions which were either blocked or allowed to 
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proceed to completion by Monitor/NHSI suggest that these were judged based on the 
financial and clinical viability rather than any effects on competition.  
Thus, the bulk of the regulatory activity with regards to mergers and acquisition in 
the NHS took place at the sectoral decision making level. The rules applied by the 
sector regulator in judging those decisions were not transparent but the outcomes 
suggest that financial and clinical viability concerns trumped any concerns about 
competition. This implies that both the sector and national regulators of competition 
utilised the flexibilities inherent in the legal framework on how the competition 
ought to be viewed. 
Procurement and commissioning  
In contrast to mergers and acquisitions, the application of sector specific 
understanding of competition has been less successful in handling procurement 
disputes. This was largely because of the rising salience of the courts, another actor 
external to the NHS, in the reviewed period. The new Public Contracts Regulations 
2015 explicitly stated that these regulations, which govern procedural aspects of the 
procurement processes, now applied to the procurement of health care services. The 
PCR 2015 regulations have made it easier to challenge procurement decisions based 
on procedural grounds.  
We outline the regulatory decisions and activity of Monitor/NHSI with regards to 
procurement disputes and discuss key court judgements.  
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Table 2. Summary of regulatory decisions regarding procurement in the NHS 
(August 2015 – October 2018)  
Case type Decision-making body Cases investigated Outcome of the investigation and date 
Procurement Monitor/ NHS 
Improvement* 
Northern Devon Healthcare NHS 
Trust/ complex adult community 
services  
NHSI found that CCG did not breach 
the PPCCR 2013 26/08/2015  
 Care UK/NE London Treatment 
Centre 
 
Investigation closed without reaching 
conclusion as to whether the rules 
were breached 05/08/2016 
 
 Courts Injunctions**: 
 
Counted4 CIC vs Sunderland City 
Council 
 
 
 
Council failed to lift Northumbria and 
Tyne and Wear NHS FT contract 
award suspension 18/12/2015 
 
 Kent Community Health FT vs 
Dartford, Gravesham and Swanley 
CCG and Swale CCG 
NHS trust failed to lift Virgin Care 
contract award suspension 
27/05/2016 
 
 Sysmex Ltd vs Imperial College 
Healthcare NHS Trust 
NHS trust succeeded in lifting Abbott 
Laboratories Ltd contract award 
suspension 21/07/2017 
 
 Lancashire Care FT & Blackpool 
Teaching Hospitals FT vs 
Lancashire County Council  
 
Council failed to lift Virgin care 
contract award suspension 
08/02/2018  
 
 
 Central Surrey Health vs Surrey 
Downs CCG 
CCG failed to lift IDEEA alliance 
(led by Epsom and St Helier 
University NHS Trust) contract 
award suspension 18/10/2018 
 Full Trials: 
 
Lancashire Care FT & Blackpool 
Teaching Hospitals FT vs 
Lancashire County Council 
 
 
 
NHS trusts succeeded in challenging 
contract award to Virgin Care 
22/06/2018  
 
Commissioning QSRC Ltd vs NHSE Private provider did not succeed in 
challenging NHSE’s commissioning 
decision 21/12/2015 
* Cases refer to ‘Formal Investigations’ listed on Monitor/NHSI’s website 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/procurement-choice-and-competition-in-the-nhs-documents-and-
guidance,   accessed on 30/08/2018. 
** Injunctions refer to procurement disputes under the PCR 2015. 
 
Monitor/NHSI investigations 
Handling of procurement complaints by Monitor/NHSI under the PPCCR 2013 
lacked transparency. In the reviewed period there were only two procurement 
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disputes which have been escalated by Monitor/NHSI to a formal investigation (see 
Table 2). Both of them followed a provider complaint. Neither of them found any 
definitive breaches of the PPCCR 2013 (Monitor, 2015; NHSI, 2016; see also 
Sanderson et al., 2016). For instance, in May 2016 Monitor/NHSI closed its 
investigation into the procurement of the North East London Treatment Centre 
without reaching a conclusion as to whether the procurement rules were breached 
(NHSI, 2016). An incumbent independent provider, Care UK, alleged that the CCGs 
breached the rules by offering the contract to the local NHS acute trust below 
national tariff price which allegedly posed risks to quality and safety of services. 
Monitor/NHSI accepted the undertakings by the CCGs to cease the procurement 
exercise and extend the contract for provision of services with Care UK followed by 
the re-procurement process (NHSI, 2016).5  
There was no information publicly disclosed on Monitor/NHSI’s website about 
formal investigations into procurement breaches conducted after 2016. The CMA 
(2016; 2017b; 2018b) concurrency reports did not mention any further 
Monitor/NHSI’s regulatory activity. We also found no activity in respect of 
enforcement of the competition licence condition of the provider licencing regime. 
However, we found at least two procurement disputes where the involvement of 
Monitor/NHSI was explicitly mentioned by the HSJ reporters (Coggan, 2017; 
Thomas, 2017), and it seems likely that Monitor/NHSI was involved in more 
disputes due to its statutory role. However, the limited visibility of Monitor/NHSI’s 
role in handling such disputes suggests that during the reviewed period 
Monitor/NHSI sought to avoid putting procurement disputes prominently on the 
agenda to align with the de-prioritisation of competition in the policy discourse. 
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Court judgments 
At the same time providers were using the levers available in the legal framework to 
challenge procurement decisions directly in the courts, based predominantly on 
alleged breaches of the PCR 2015. In the reviewed period there were two court 
judgements regarding procurement and commissioning complaints and five 
injunction decisions (see Table 2). There was no clear pattern in the outcomes of 
decisions on procurement disputes delivered by the courts. 
Following a legal challenge by the local acute NHS trusts in May 2018 the High 
Court ruled that Lancashire County Council had not carried out the procurement in 
accordance with the PCR 2015 and ordered that the two bids from Virgin Care and 
local NHS acute trusts must be re-evaluated ([2018] EWHC 1589 (TCC) High 
Court). The breach of the rules concerned the insufficiency of the reasons given by 
the council for the scores it awarded to the tenderers. Following the re-evaluation of 
the bids, the contract has been awarded to the original winner Virgin Care (Dunhill, 
2018); it is not clear at the time of writing (January 2019) whether the NHS acute 
trusts will dispute this outcome once again.  
Another case was brought by an independent provider of specialist radiosurgery 
services under the PPCCR 2013 in the pre-procurement dispute against NHSE which 
ceased to commission its services ([2015] EWHC 3752 (Admin) High Court). The 
judicial review examined what it means to be an ‘existing provider’ in the light of 
Monitor’s 2014 guidance on commissioning radiosurgery services and any 
guarantees that stem from it (Monitor, 2014b). Overall, the court found that the 
NHSE did not breach the PPCCR 2013.  
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In the reviewed period, the courts also issued five contract injunction rulings under 
the PCR 2015 (see Table 2). Although the injunction decisions did not test the 
procedural or substantive issues in respect of procurement processes, by submitting a 
claim form the aggrieved providers stalled the contract award process which gave 
them leverage over commissioners.  
In addition to the cases which were heard in the courts, we identified at least six 
other legal challenges reported in the HSJ that were dropped and/or settled out of 
court. The details of settlement between the parties and any potential role that 
Monitor/NHSI may have played in settling the disputes were not disclosed. Press 
reports indicated that some of such cases involved awards of financial damages to 
private providers (Moore, 2017) or a review or an extension of the contract 
(Gammie, 2018; Lintern, 2018).  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis of the regulatory decisions has shown that the sector regulator 
Monitor/NHSI has succeeded in ensuring that the NHS merger control regime was 
subject to sector specific rules governing competition. This was achieved by 
cultivating a working relationship with the national regulator, the CMA, rather than 
through legislative change. Arguably, the attempts to bring procurement oversight 
under internal NHS control have proved less successful. Even though one can 
assume that the bulk of regulatory activity pertaining to procurement disputes 
remained within the remit of the sector regulator, Monitor/NHSI and hidden from 
public view, the litigation opportunities contained in the formal regulations made the 
actions of actors within the system more difficult to command and control. 
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Furthermore due the independence of the judiciary, it was by definition impossible to 
reach a memorandum of understanding on the way competition in the NHS ought to 
be viewed by the courts. The courts thus remained firmly outside of the sphere of 
influence of the sector regulator and applied the law. 
These findings brought a number of issues to the fore. Firstly, a lack of transparency 
of Monitor/NHSI’s actions in the reviewed period could be interpreted as an attempt 
to keep competition issues off the policy agenda, given that competition disputes 
became problematic for the sector regulator since the policy turn to collaboration. 
The insights from the policy analysis literature demonstrate that it is a prerogative of 
the powerful to keep conflicts which are potentially detrimental to the authority’s 
dominant position or prevailing discourse from surfacing to the level of public 
visibility (Lukes, 2005). The regulator sent a signal to the actors that competition 
enforcement has moved down its agenda, tacitly giving permission to follow a more 
collaborative path in commissioning. On the other hand the loss of visibility of 
regulatory decision making may have added to the actors’ confusion about the 
prevailing rules in the system. The observed decrease in transparency in the 
application of rules by Monitor/NHSI also had negative implications for 
accountability of the NHS governing structures to the public (Benbow, 2018; Horton 
and Lynch‐Wood, 2018). Secondly, deploying an ‘out of sight out of mind’ strategy 
could not fully succeed due to the independent role of the courts and the legal levers 
available to providers. In that sense our findings concur with the insights from the 
regulation literature showing that the introduction of formal legislation into the 
system hitherto governed by the sector specific principles reduces the power of the 
sector specific regulator.  
26 
 
However, we argue that the extent of and potential for juridification in this area is 
limited by a number of factors. It is important to stress that, based on the volume of 
regulatory activity, the sector regulator Monitor/NHSI dominated two other 
regulators – the CMA and the courts. This domination was largely hidden from 
public view, arguably due to the need to keep competition issues down the policy 
agenda. Moreover, as the judgments based on the PCR 2015 showed, the courts’ 
remit was limited to scrutinising procurement processes for procedural flaws only. 
This remit of the courts is reflected in the solely procedural remedies that can be 
applied; considering whether competition is a desirable mechanism of procuring 
clinical services was outside that remit. For instance, in one of the injunction cases, 
the judge stressed that it was “not for the Court to second-guess the CCG’s decision 
to put the services out for procurement” ([2016] EWHC 1393 (TCC)). Finally, it 
appears that the substantive issue which the PPCCR 2013 raises of how to weigh the 
factors of patient needs, quality, efficiency, service integration and value for money 
alongside aspects of transparency, proportionality and equal treatment of providers 
and whether to issue a tender at all, have not been tested in courts. It is not clear why 
to date there has been no judicial review of commissioners’ decisions based on the 
alleged mistaken prioritisation of some factors over others, failure to tender or an 
unwarranted use of competitive tendering. Such challenges would be more 
consequential for curbing the power of sector regulator Monitor/NHSI than the 
current procedural cases. Thus, although we concur with Davies (2013) that the 
observed increased role of the courts strengthened the role of market principles in the 
NHS, we also argue that the solely procedural remit of the courts was one of the 
factors limiting the extent of juridification of the regulation of competition in the 
NHS.  
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The legal framework extended the scope of providers’ strategies by offering an 
opportunity to bypass the sector regulator Monitor/NHSI in procurement disputes, 
but it did not offer any substantive assurances in favour of a particular 
commissioning approach or one type of a provider. Thus, winning a court case based 
on the procedural breaches in the procurement process did not guarantee winning the 
procurement process itself, as the Lancashire case demonstrated. Conversely, a mere 
threat of a legal action or obtaining an injunction triggering an automatic suspension 
of the contract could be sufficient in achieving the complaining provider’s aims on 
the ground (e.g. Moore, 2017; Gammie, 2018; Lintern, 2018). This raises questions 
about the prudence of pursuing the legal route of settling procurement complaints by 
the NHS providers, given the high costs of litigation.  
There is no doubt that the legal framework inflated the transactions costs associated 
with operating the internal market in the NHS by imposing national competition 
oversight of the NHS mergers and promoting litigation on procedural grounds. The 
fact that Monitor/NHSI effectively pre-approved mergers that it put forward to the 
CMA and that the CMA largely accepted the sector specific understanding of the 
competition, made the CMA’s involvement in the NHS merger reviews somewhat 
redundant. The litigation on the grounds of procedural fairness of procurement 
processes had substantial costs to the taxpayer regardless of the outcome. Apart from 
direct costs of litigation, there were also increased transaction costs of having to 
repeat the procurement process in the case of a successful challenge. However, the 
more fundamental question about the appropriateness of competition in the NHS 
remained unexamined. Meanwhile, commissioners continued to be exposed to the 
threat of litigation, in particular from the independent providers (NHS Support 
Federation, 2017) whilst the regulators showed no commitment to support the 
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commissioners should their decisions be subject to a legal challenge (NHSE and 
NHSI, 2017: 16; Timmins, 2018).  
Overall, our analysis paints a complex picture of regulatory forces at play. In spite of 
years of marketisation reforms, the hierarchical mode of command and control in the 
NHS has been remarkably resilient. This may be due to hierarchy’s better capacity to 
control rising costs of delivering health care in the system or to problematic 
dynamics of competition itself. NHS provider budgets are increasingly stretched and 
the costs of providing health care are rising in the system as a whole (Charlesworth 
and Johnson, 2018; Gainsbury, 2017). Competition in such a cash-strapped system 
cannot function properly because of the lack of excess capacity needed for the 
suppliers to compete with each other and for the purchasers to have an effective 
choice of a supplier (Dawson, 1995). Competition in the NHS thus remains 
“selective” and subject to “differential regulation” (Dawson, 1995: 16) rather than 
driven by the economic efficiency. Furthermore, competition in the markets has a 
tendency over time to transform into a monopoly or an oligopoly due to the original 
winners enjoying the benefits of control over asset specific investments and other 
suppliers attempting to ward off the hazards of this ‘fundamental transformation’ by 
vertically integrating (Williamson, 1985).  
In this regulatory environment dominated by the NHS hierarchy we found only a 
limited space for juridification of the regulatory decisions, and that this was driven 
by the forces outside of the NHS hierarchy’s control, namely the transnational EU 
legislation transposed into the PCR 2015 applicable to all public sector bodies 
procuring goods and services.  
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Arguably, the limits of juridification are also delineated by the particular set up of 
the English legal system. The courts in England see their role vis-à-vis the executive 
as limited to upholding and advancing a particular model of procedural justice and 
on the whole eschew adjudication on the substantive issues affecting health care 
provision (Syrett, 2011). The judicial reviews thus focus on examining the fairness 
of the procedures by which certain decisions were made by the public bodies rather 
than merits of those decisions per se. Litigation is also deemed an option of the last 
resort. This perhaps explains why more fundamental issues around the rationale and 
appropriateness of the market in the NHS so far have not been tested in the courts.  
Thus, the way competition is regulated in the NHS is an example of the hybrid mode 
of English public sector governance characterised by the centralised political control 
over the way internal markets are allowed to operate, as well as hierarchical funding 
and accountability flows (Allen et al., 2011). There is a lot of political discretion in 
the system helped by the fact that the law remains ambiguous. The quasi-market in 
the NHS functions on the state hierarchy’s terms and is allowed to ebb and flow 
depending on the prevailing policy preference. The competition mechanism 
supported by an option of direct litigation remains residual and subservient to the 
decision making by the political hierarchy.   
Nevertheless, the misalignment between the legal rules and government policy 
trickling down the NHS hierarchy remains uncomfortable for some actors and 
detrimental to the development of some policies. It is being tackled by utilising the 
existing flexibilities in the legal framework, in particular “doing less of [tendering 
and procurement]” (Timmins, 2018). Our analysis has shown that the commissioners 
are more likely to face legal action if they decide to tender a service than if they 
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decide not to tender. Equally, the discretion can be exercised based on the PCR 2015 
which allows the commissioners to be creative with the procurement procedure, 
scoring and contract award criteria and effectively ‘design out’ unwelcome bids. Our 
review has shown that some aspects of the current regulatory framework allow for 
more flexibility and discretion than others. In particular, the merger approval process 
seems to pose fewer issues in terms of following sector specific rules on competition 
than procurement disputes which are harder for the sector regulator to control. 
Alongside reliance on the existing flexibilities, the need for the legislative reform is 
being increasingly recognised (Darzi et al., 2018; DHSC, 2018; NHSE, 2019). The 
NHS Long Term Plan published in January 2019 calls for a legislative change to 
enable more rapid system transformation towards collaborative commissioning and 
provision. In particular, the plan proposes to remove the CMA’s oversight of the 
NHS mergers and Monitor/NHSI’s competition enforcement roles (NHSE, 2019). It 
proposes among other things that commissioners should be free to decide the 
circumstances in which they should use procurement and that the NHS should be 
exempt from “wholesale inclusion in the Public Contract Regulations” (NHSE, 
2019: 114). Instead, the NHS policy makers propose to introduce sector specific 
statutory guidance for the NHS and to pursue closer integration between NHSE and 
Monitor/NHSI. 
The proposed changes are consistent with the conclusions of our analysis of the 
consequences of the current regulatory framework. They signal continuing shift 
away from the market principles, blurring of the purchaser provider split and 
strengthening of the executive, sector specific powers of control over the system. 
They amount to acknowledging, at least in the policy terms, that the NHS is not a 
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market and therefore should not be subject to or oblige to endorse the market 
principles. These are all welcome developments. However, it is important to note 
that to deliver on these proposals will require complex legislative processes 
involving many stakeholders with diverse interests and agendas. Agreeing the 
changes to the HSCA 2012 and passing them through parliament will be a 
challenging task, given the current political context (Timmins, 2018). The PCR 
2015, due to its wider applicability to public sector and its transnational provenance, 
may be even more difficult to amend. The likelihood of amending the PCR 2015 will 
also depend on any trade agreements that the UK government would wish to pursue 
after leaving the European Union. Thus, it remains to be seen which of these 
legislative proposals and in what form materialise in law.   
 
ENDNOTES 
1 The threshold is currently set at £615,278 (CCS, 2017). 
2 The trusts decide whether or not to notify the CMA of a proposed transaction. If the 
trusts decide not to notify the CMA (even though their merger would be deemed 
reviewable by the CMA), the CMA may initiate review up to four months following 
completion of the transaction (NHSI, 2017: 12).  
3 Under the Regulation 17 of the PPCCR (no. 2) 2013 procedural issues cannot be 
dealt jointly under the PCR 2015 and PPCCR (no. 2) 2013. If the provider brings 
action under the PCR 2015 they may not bring one about the same issue under the 
PPCCR (no. 2) 2013.  
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4 In particular, we searched the https://www.gov.uk/government/groups directory for 
evidence of completion of mergers and acquisitions identified through the HSJ 
search. 
5 In September 2017 Care UK won the re-procurement process and was awarded a 
three-year contract to run the services at the NELTC (Clover, 2017).  
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APPENDIX 1. Relationships between commissioners, providers and regulators in 
the NHS in England as of December 2018 
 
 
Since the introduction of a quasi-market in the English NHS at the beginning of the 
1990s, service provision is managed by commissioning bodies which procure 
services on behalf of patients. Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) are the local 
bodies responsible for commissioning the majority of services, overseen by NHS 
England (NHSE). NHSE also has some direct commissioning responsibility for low 
volume/high complexity services, and for primary care services (see Figure above). 
NHSE (formally named the NHS Commissioning Board in the HSCA 2012) is an 
Arm’s Length Body, operating under a mandate from the Department of Health and 
Social Care (Checkland et al., 2013). 
The system is funded through general taxation and the services are free at the point 
of delivery for UK residents. Competition (either ‘for the market’ or ‘in the market’) 
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is one of the mechanisms used by commissioners to allocate resources to service 
providers. Allocative decisions are based on the consideration of the rights and needs 
of the collective, as well as the individual. In order to encourage the diversification 
of providers, the entry of independent sector providers has been encouraged as well 
as the establishment of a new type of NHS provider organisation with a greater 
degree of autonomy under the Health and Social Care Act 2003– NHS Foundation 
Trusts (NHS FT) (Allen et al., 2012). The resultant system is referred to as a ‘quasi-
market’ which aims to combine the supposed advantages of competition between 
suppliers with the safety of retaining public funding to protect fairness in access to 
care (Allen, 2013). Despite this diversification of providers and incentives for 
competition, evidence suggests that the hierarchical aspect of the NHS extends to the 
supply side (Allen, 2013).  
Competitive behaviour within the quasi-market is heavily regulated, with 
competition on the basis of price limited. To enter the quasi-market of the NHS, 
providers need to be registered with the quality regulator, the Care Quality 
Commission and have a provider licence issued by the economic regulator 
Monitor/NHSI. Their clinical and financial performance is then continuously 
monitored by these regulators. Monitor/NHSI also has a duty to ensure that the 
commissioners of health care services – the CCGs and NHSE – use competition 
appropriately.  
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APPENDIX 2. Competition and procurement rules applicable to the NHS and 
enforcing bodies (August 2015 - October 2018) 
Rules Status Applicability Enforcing body 
Competition Act 1998 Law All aspects of the economy Competition and Markets 
Authority (concurrent 
responsibilities with 
Monitor/NHS Improvement)// 
Courts 
Enterprise Act 2002 Law All aspects of the economy Competition and Markets 
Authority (concurrent 
responsibilities with 
Monitor/NHS Improvement)// 
Courts 
Health and Social Care 
Act 2012 
Law Commissioners and providers of 
NHS services in England 
Monitor/NHS Improvement// 
Courts 
Procurement, Patient 
Choice and Competition 
Regulations 2013 
Law Commissioners and providers of 
NHS services in England 
Monitor/NHS Improvement// 
Courts 
Public Contracts 
Regulations 2015 
Law All public authorities in England Courts 
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